Islamic Nationalism

Introduction

            The Quran sets forth Islamic rule as a precondition for the attainment of true faith (see Quran 4:65).  In response to this verse, Qutb (n.d.) stated that “only this is Islam, and only this is Dar-ul-Islam [i.e., Land of Islam]-not the soil, not the race, not the lineage, not the tribe, and not the family.” This clear and concise rejection of social groupings leaves the Muslims with only one option with which to organize collectively: Islam. Within the current socio-political climate there is an overwhelming sentiment of secularism and overall emphasis on the localized and particular nation-states as the model structure for societies. However, the concept of Islamic nationalism is the practice of the ideal collective identity of the Muslims worldwide. Despite the fact that throughout much of history the Muslims have had Islamic governing and Muslims rulers these dynamics have changed with the rise power of the imperial West. In modern times, secular nation-states dominate international politics, and as such the Muslims must respond with action that is Islamic in content but understandable by the opposing forces, the answer is Islamic nationalism. This paper will be an attempt at understanding this concept and its implications.

Definitions

            In order to better proceed with a correct understanding of Islamic nationalism, and nationalism in general, certain terms must be defined or translated from Arabic, the native tongue of Islam.

Nationalism. Gellner (1983) stated that this “is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (p. 1).

Cultural culture. Cesari (2005) stated that this is the “perpetuation and/or recreation of various cultural practices…” (Ethnicity, French-style).

Ethnic belonging. Cesari (2005) defined stated that this “refers to identification-often very loose or removed-with a particular ethnic origin, but without this identification necessarily entailing any particular customs or types of behavior” (Ethnicity, French-style).

            Watan. This is best defined as the homeland (Munson, 2003)

or country (Satri al-Husri, as cited in Haim, 1955).

Qaum. Can best be translated as the people of a particular geo-political area (Satri al-Husri, as cited in Haim, 1955).

Wataniyya. In elaboration of the watan, this is the patriotism (i.e., emotional attachment) associated with a particular homeland (Satri al-Husri, as cited in Haim, 1955)

Qaumiyya: In elaboration of the qaum, this is the sense of attachment and responsibility to one’s group of belonging, in other words nationalism (Satri al-Husri, as cited in Haim, 1955.

These last translations are notable in that they distinguish nationalism as an attachment to the people rather than the land, as is common with the secular nation-states; this is significant as the discussion of Islamic nationalism proceeds.

Collective Dynamics of Islam

            In Islam, the sense of nationalism is best described as a brotherhood rooted in faith rather than just a secular tie of a socio-political nature. Scholars have mentioned that there is no nationality but rather only a universal brotherhood (Al-Haqqani, 2006). This perspective is supported in the Quran when it states “Innama-l muminuna ikhwa” (i.e., Verily the believers are brothers to each others). Qutb (n.d.) further supported this concept of an Islamic universal brotherhood when he stated that “Islam came to establish only one relationship which binds men together in the sight of God….In the world there is only one party of God.” Further evidence of this brotherhood can be found throughout the Quran and the prophetic traditions. The Quran (23:53) states that we are a single ummah, which is widely known and respected. However, Muslims go wrong in taking specific nations, ethnicities, races, or tribes as their primary identity.

These erroneous public identities should only be to recognize each other, in other words as a cognitive tool to ease social relations and not divisive traits (Quran 49:13). In actuality these are signs to know the fact of creation by one Lord (Quran 30:22). Throughout numerous prophetic traditions found in the collections of both Muslim, Bukhari and others it is recorded that the Prophet Muhammad prohibited any form of pride stemming from lineage, ethnicity, race, tribe, or nationalism. The prohibition went to the extent that such pride was compared to something rotten, reason for falling out of Islam, or most graphic of all comparable to biting the genitals of one’s father (“Sources from Quran and Hadith,” n.d.).

            However effective the ideal plan of Islam may be, the reality is that the current conditions of Muslims worldwide is less than ideal and that rather they are worrisome and maladaptive. Despite consistent secular arguments against it, the root cause of this is the failure of Muslims to fulfill the comprehensive conditions of Islam. Instead the Muslims worldwide have fallen victim to the pride of nations, ethnicities, races, or tribes.

In the Western context this identification is characterized by experience of discrimination and cultural loss (Cesari, 2005). In additions, the Islamophobic rhetoric from the media, the distance between religious authority or even adherence and minority Muslims in the West is widespread and further burdens the collective of Muslims. Based upon the observations of Cesari, Muslim shops; cafes; and most importantly cultural spaces must be accessible to Muslim youth to prevent deprivation of and exclusion of an Islamic communal life. Cesari is keen in addressing the need for institutions that are conducive to the strengthening and spread of an Islamic identity by Muslims of all backgrounds.

            Another point of contention is that within the Muslim community there has always been diversity and seemingly competing national and ethnic identities. Qutb (n.d.) effectively pointed to the prophetic model to demonstrate that Islam has always been a diverse community of believers. He noted Suhaib al-Rumi (i.e., the Roman), Bilal al-Habashi (i.e., the Abyssinian), and Salman al-Farsi (i.e., the Persian). These were not only among the first followers but some of the most knowledgeable due to being among the closest to the Prophet Muhammad. As a remedy for the disease of division Qutb (n.d.) mentioned the prophetic tradition that says “Get rid of these partisanships [pride of lineage which is the voice of nationalism]; these are foul things…He is not one of us who calls toward partisanship, who fights for partisanship, and who dies for partisanship.” The logic is clear that though racial, ethnic, or national identities exist, they cannot be prideful nor supersede the priority of the brotherhood of Islam. Muslims must realize that worldly titles, those not based off of revelation, are “wrong and false” (Al-Haqqani, 2006). Al-Haqqani stated that “we are Muslims and there is no other honour of being something above this.”

            Muslim-dominated countries that seek to live Islam fully must strive for establishing a true Islamic nation that is not tied to down to a particular gerographic area (i.e., governed according to shari’a) or at least that is based on a network of varying Islamic nations. This Islamic alliance is based on belief and divides accordingly (see Quran 58:22). Qutb (n.d.) elaborated that any grouping otherwise is nothing more than primitive traces of man’s ignorance. According to Qutb (n.d.), Dar-ul-Islam (i.e., Land of Islam) is not a specific territory but rather where ever the shari’a is being implemented fully by the inhabitant population of Muslims. This perspective allows for an Islamic nationalism arising out of and within existing nation-states, though the host nation would eventually be replaced though reformation. Zubaida (2004) agreed with Qutb’s analysis that Islamic nationalism is not tied to specific geographic territory but rather a universal understanding. However, he noted that the reality of this Islamic nationalism often takes the role of particular nation-states or regions. Examples of this tendency are the Muslim Rashid Rida and the Christian Michel Aflaq (Zubaida).

Current Reality

            In order to fully be able to understand the role and nature of Islamic nationalism a discussion of the current reality of the Muslim community must take place. The conditions of the Muslims show both failures and successes in the area of unity, collective action, and the establishment of Islam.

            The truth is that Muslims have failed to centralize their efforts and put forth an organized united front, instead they have created fragmented communities across Western societies (Warner & Wenner, 2006). However, I argue that perhaps unity can be redefined not as the coordinated efforts but rather the shared nature of the work done by the Muslims. This redefinition would significantly reduce level of division perceived in the community, and perhaps with a shift of perception can come a shift in intergroup communication and coordination.

            Repeatedly, Zubaida (2004) noted the current dominance of the nation-states dominating politics. Though this might be true, it does not invalidate the Islamic model (i.e., Muslim community of Madina under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad) as a viable and effective one. The current state of the Muslims in the West is characterized by the secular and nationalistic identities (Zubaida, 2004). This secularization as Gellner (as cited in Mabry, 1998) points out is a violation of being in a state of Islam and being a Muslim. So in contrast to Mabry’s perspective, a Muslims that chooses other than Islam to dictate his/her life has fallen out of the fold of Islam. Within specific nationalisms, this is a contentious position to Western nations and within diverse immigrant Muslim populations in the West. However, these secularized Muslims fit in with other sects of society and thus are accepted and rewarded for such behavior (Zubaida, 2003).

            Non-Muslim or secular accommodating commentators label Islamic nationalists as confrontational  (Zubaida, 2003). Though this is true, it is presented in a negative light to discredit the Islamic perspective. The very nature of national politics is confrontational and contentious between varying perspectives. Furthermore, Purcell (2003) notes how European countries are aware of the Muslim populations and their national identities and exacerbated the contentions between the immigrants and the native citizens. However, Muslims need to further their Islamic nationalism and basic Muslim identity by ceasing to take an inferior position of denying this contention and seeking a pleading accommodating position by the system. Friedland (2001) described Islamic politics as that of “love” (p. 135). However, it must elaborated that this love is expressed through the fulfillment of rights and responsibilities to God, the self, family, umma, and mankind in total; each level having some shared and some differentiated details. It is the Islamic nationalists responsibility to elaborate these rights and responsibilities to the populations of specific geographies but while being consistent in focusing on the universal brotherhood of Islam that must be unified and established globally.

            Currently, Muslim nationalists in the West focus on national issues such as housing and education (Zubaida, 2003). Though these are rightful causes, these issues must be addressed in an alternative method of engagement and not through the system-sponsored processes; as this would put Muslims in the inferior pleading-position. Durkheim’s (as cited in Mabry, 1998) concept of the self-celebrating religious community is not in existence any longer, but rather has been replaced by secular nation-states, which are much celebrated by immigrant Muslim populations in the West. This is a direct violation of the very nature of Islam. In order to correct this malfunction in contemporary social dynamics an Islamic nationalism must be developed and established, in whatever land that may be possible in. Islamic nationalists have fallen prey to the same traps of the other religious nationalists by focusing only on their specific nation-states rather than on the global implementation with a localized goal (Freidland, 2001). In defense of these activists, it can be explained that these mistakes were made because of the logistical reasons of fulfilling the nationalist goals. However, what must be done is that a global network must be developed so that varying nationalist specifics can share the lessons learned, whether through successes or failures.

The current breakdown of the economic sovereignty of nation-states can be directly attributed to the American agenda of “neoliberal international economic restructuring” (Lubeck, n.d., p. 296) under the leadership of Reagan. This has been the opportunity needed for the seed of Islamic nationalism to take hold in the societies of Muslims nations (Lubeck). The truth is that this unilateral benefit, for the Western powers, is what the current socio-political order is all about, in other words a continued neocolonial imperialism that stretches from the Western powers to all the corners of the globe.

            The current reality is that the Muslim world is riddled with Gellner’s (1983) breach of political propriety by having rulers whose behavior put them outside of the fold of Islam, the national sentiment being oppressed. In addition, the immigrant Muslims in the West are riddled with the same problem being the minority in non-Islamic countries. These conditions create the need for the Islamic nationalist movement to develop.

 

 

Process Dynamics of Muslims and Islamic Nationalism

            Throughout the literature and the actual political process many elements need to be factored in. However, often times these contributing forces are ignored or, worse yet, they are confused. The decentralized nature of the Islamic religion allows great flexibility and adaptability to the needs of the populations and their environment.

            Cesari (2005), through the example of North Africans in France, demonstrates that dominant political and resource exclusion of Muslim immigrants in the western world results in confusion. Mainly, this confusion is the “fact that the issues of poverty, ethnicity, and Islam tend to be conflated…” (Introduction). Many times the isolated youth in the West do develop Islamically identified groups, but this is only the aftermath of Islam becoming a racialized-ethnic group in the dominant discourse (Cesari, 2005). In other words, though there are traces of Islam in these groups and their ideology their content, goals, and traditions are not based on Islam. The restoration and strengthening of the family, the basic building block of any nation, is strongly supported in Islam, and thus should be a goal of Islamic nationalists. Friedland (2001) characterizes religious nationalists as giving priority to the family, Islam would not deviate from this description. In many cases the family has suffered because the state has grasped and used ethnicity as a strategic political tool to control the target ethnic group (Cesari, 2005). The same can be said, as of late, with certain Muslim-identified political leaders (e.g., Andre Carson & Keith Ellison) in the United States.

            There has been a slow and steady confusion of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion. Munson (2003) cites the Islamic resistance to European imperialism as the instigating factor. However, this overlap of religious affiliation and oppression has been in place for thousands of years. The Quran tells of stories of the Children of Israel, the true believers in past times, as being oppressed by Egyptian and other pagans. In addition, the un-Islamic affiliation and identification of oppressors throughout time is clear, even with so called Muslim leaders. The Islamic nationalists as well as the scholars of all social sciences must make a distinction between a Muslim by name and the person in the state of Islam (i.e., submission to God through the practice of Islam).

            Muslims must shake of the idea of superiority to non-Muslims; Keddie (1969) points this out alongside solidarity as the nationalist emphasis placed on Islam by Islamic nationalists. However, Islamic principles denounce any feeling of superiority by people. Muslims must realize that it is only Islam that is superior to any other alternative, so in accepting and practicing Islam the individual is empowered to higher status spiritually. The Muslim must therefore remain humble in this world and remain steadfast to the description given in the Quran of the successful and best nation: enjoining good and forbidding evil.

            In other words, the revolutionary nature of Islam is to reform mankind to a productive member of society in all senses: culturally, economically, socially, emotionally, spiritually, and so on. Qutb (n.d.) stated that “Islam came to return man to his Sustainer and to make His guidance the only source from which values and standards are to be obtained, as He is the Provider and Originator.” Islamic scholars of times past have rightfully pointed out that man’s social nature creates a need for cooperation to achieve success in the social groups we create or join (Haim, 1955). Contrary to Haim’s belief, al-Husri is correct starting from the individual’s feelings in theorizing about social dynamics. This is truly an Islamic concept derived from Quran because of the stress on individual reason, responsibility, decisions, and ultimate accountability to the groups he gives allegiance to.

 

Islamic Nationalism

As discussed in the translations and definitions, there is a distinctive feature of the Islamic concept of nationalism. Al-Kawakibi (as cited in Haim, 1955) defines the umma as the result of the feeling of qaumiyya. This is true in that membership is not primordial not everlasting, but by willing choice. The Muslim must therefore have the feeling membership under the conditions of belief, obedience, and struggle in order to join and remain.  

Qutb’s (n.d.) observations and writings best described the dynamic and original relationship that exists between Islam and the modern concept of nationalism. Concerning this matter, he stated

Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the shari’ah of God is established and human relationships are based on the foundation of relationship with God; a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in Dar-ul-Islam.

Furthermore, the modern Islamic nationalist must realize that though the lands that were under Islamic rule in the past have been lost this does not negate the need for Islam to be established where it may be possible.

Islamic nationalism is nothing more than the practical application of the collective identity of the ummah. It is the implemented concept of the brotherhood of Muslims falling under the authority of Islam, and not of anything else. There is a parallel between the state and religions because both are “models of authority” (Friedland, 2001, p. 127). However, the distinction is that Islam does not recognize any authority other than that of God, so the Islamic nationalism in practice is an obligation upon the collective. This obligation should be rightfully fulfilled while maintaining focus that any alternative system is a by-product of a different (i.e., non-Islamic) ideology (e.g., Western secular nation-states being products of Christianity; Friedland). Campbell (1999) cites other scholars in the claim that ethnicity, race, and nationalisms are socially constructed forms of identity particular to the public sphere. So the Islamic nationalism is the only viable option to call for and address the needs of the individual publicly and privately. For with every private act of worship, the Muslim will be reminded on his place in relation to God and in relation to the other people. He realizes that he is one of many and that there are rights and responsibilities of his due to the fellow members of the Muslim community, the Islamic nation.

This concept, Islamic nationalism, must be an internally developed and nurtured institution. It cannot, and will not, be successful if it externally imposed such as the Muslim umbrella groups in certain Western European nations (Warner & Wenner, 2006). In addition, Islamic nationalism should be a form of participation and not a form of assimilation, as has been the tendency of the Western states (Warner & Wenner).

With a correct understanding of the Islam’s purpose, man’s purpose within Islam, and the comprehensive reach of Islam then the link between Islam as a religious practice and as the basis for a society, state, and global nation is easy to understand and implement. Commenting on this concept of Islam and social practices, Ronnby (2008) stated

What makes Islam unique as a religion is that Islam, in itself, is clearly political. Islam is not just a religion. Islam does not distinguish between civil society and the state. The Islamic society is also the state and the politics through which it is governed. Islam does not distinguish between the spiritual life and the secular one. All public and private matters fall under the holy law, sharia. (p. 1)

Al-Ghazzali (as quoted in Haim, 1955) stated that “This is why religion and rule have been called twins. It is said that religion is a foundation and rule a guardian; what has no foundation is destroyed, and what has no guardian is lost” (p. 148).

Modernization, in better words the post-colonial effects on the oppressed lands, has reduced the imagined community of the Muslim from the level of the entire umma to that of his homeland as the ultimate hierarchy. Haim (1955) stated that the watan is able to “compel love, solicitude and vigilance for it” (p. 133).  These duties were once due to the Islamic rule and the Muslim populations and territory under it. However, present-day education conditions Muslims worldwide to give them to the nation, it at all. Haim further support this claim by stating that “the notion of having duties towards it [watan] was a late accretion” (p. 135). It is true, that in jahiliyya (i.e., pre-Islamic ignorance) the duties were given to ties of kinship but with the revelation of Islam these duties were directed to God, the Prophet Muhammad, and the umma. Friedland (2001) incredibly described the dynamic work that Islamic nationalists have been striving for worldwide when he stated that “the territoriality and the historicity of the nation-state are being transformed into vessels of divine purpose” (p. 125).

Development of Islamic Nationalism

            Islamic nationalism in modern times has been can be explained as being formed as a reactionary extremism that is opposed to colonialism in the Muslim world. However, as reformulations in practice have taken place the movement has developed into being more adherent to the Islamic principles and obligations that are related. Though Zubaida (2003) indirectly mentions the rise if Islam as a marker of identity, the establishment of organizations such as the Muslim Student Association would prove the contrary. This is especially true since the Muslim Student Association was founded in the North American higher education system. Mabry (199) argues that religion only plays a role in the development of nations but not in the actual content of its identification. In relation to Qutb’s theories of Islamic nationalism, this is incomplete because Islam is the identity of the Islamic national. Mabry’s misconceptions are expected in the secular, territory-specific strain of nationalist thinking however, Islamic nationalism is markedly distinct from this.

            Far too often theorists restrict the options of developing nations to two paths: “nation-building or…creating a homogeneous national culture” (Campbell, 1999, p. 103). The development of the Islamic nationalism must not call for this but rather for the building of a central Islamic identity (e.g., Muslims or Islamic nationals) that is enriched with diversity of ethnic and cultural specifics within it. Though there are remarkable resemblances the Islamic nationalism cannot and should not be compared to the secular, particular nationalism. Keddie (1969) noted that both are “a reaction to Western Imperialism” (p. 18). However, I would argue that perhaps the threat of oppression is what awakened the Muslims to their collective loss of Islam as the guidance in their lives.

            Keddie (1969) is of the opinion that Islamic nationalism is an indigenous resistance using the framework of Islam. However, though the seeds of the Islamic nationalism are particular, its growth has followed a global movement. Especially with the recent developments of technology, high-speed communication has enabled different Islamic movements to recognize each other and strive for a more cooperative and integrated path of action. This is analogous to the awakening of the “American” identity as an imagined community that Anderson (2006) notes. Haim (1955) points to the nineteenth century as the awakening moment of the Muslims which lead to their self-awareness and efforts to counter their inferiority. However, as history duly notes rather than reflecting and turning to Islamic ideals as the answer the collective turned to imitating the secular oppressors which lead to further decline.

            Lubeck (n.d.) stated that “the pressing weight of the international state system has worked historically to institutionalize loyalty to an Islamically legitimized national state, while at a minimum the transnational umma is idealized and praised” (p. 300). This is an accurate description of the Muslim condition at present. However, what is not mentioned is that these states were created and established by the direct actions of Western entities. These states were put in place as puppets to control the masses of the former Islamic state. What the Islamic nationalist must keep in mind is that an “Islamic” name/title or a Muslim-majority population does not constitute a true and legitimate Islamic state. In addition, Lubeck sites that Islamically legitimated institutions last longer than secular ones. Though often times these institutions provide their own Islamic scholars to offer their legitimacy (Lubeck). However, this is a point that Islamic scholarship must be cleansed and revived from the true roots of the Quran and Hadith. Though there has lacked uniformity in policy or government coming from Islamic nationalist (Friedland, 2001) the diversity has increased in the practical knowledge that is shared among the numerous Islamic nationalists, this is a direct contribution to the rich and robust approach that is needed to address the challenges of the future. However, before this takes place Islamic nationalists must realize the analytical mistakes being made, both within and outside of the nationalist community, when addressing Islamic nationalism.

Analytical Mistakes

            Rida (as cited in Zubaida, 2004) argues that Islamic and Arab nationalism would not differ in a hierarchical division. He goes as far as to say that the establishment of a caliphate would be parallel to the pope, of spiritual importance and not political. This is a mistake, and worst of all a deviation from the example set forth by the Prophet Muhammad and his first four successors. In contrast, Abdallah Azzam (as cited in Zubaida, 2004) notes Arab nationalism as sinful, corrupt, and a Western import carried out by Arab Christians (e.g., Michel Aflaq).

            Far too often theorists and leaders in the Middle East have made the mistake of confusing nation states, Pan-Arab nationalism, and religion (i.e., Islam; Zubaida, 2004). Though Zubaida mentions it in a neutral or perhaps in a positive light, and I would argue that it is a maladaptive tendency Islamically, he stated that “in practice, nationalist, as well as Islamic discourses have moved between and combined these principles in relation to the problems and situations at hand” (p. 407).

The nation-specific maneuvering that Zuabiada (2004) notes is true but perhaps would better be understood in simpler terms of strategic effectiveness. In other words, these Islamic nationalists address are the most pressing, both geographically and cognitively, issues to the Muslim populations being engaged. However, many times it is the observer/theorist that makes the mistake of confusion ethnic, racial, or racial nationalism with Islamic nationalism. For example, Munson (2003) argues the Bin Laden is a Saudi Arabian member outraged over the kingdom’s behavior and that he sees Saudi Arabia as his country. However, I would argue the contrary. In fact, when you put the rhetoric and actions of Bin Laden into the theoretical context of Qutb you realize that in fact he is an authentic Islamic nationalist, though his alleged terrorist attacks have deviated from that which is permissible in Islam.

Some theorists (Haim, 1955) argue as if there is a distinction between secular and religious (e.g., Islamic) ideologies. The record must be cleared that there is not such difference, there only exists counterparts on a spectrum of religiosity. Even secular terms are religious in nature because secularism is a rejection of the monotheistic orthodoxy and a choice of logic, rationale, and human thought as the deities of worship.

So it must be reiterated that Islamic nationalism is the public display of the universal brotherhood of faith that is experienced by the Muslim ummah. The public display of allegiance is nothing more than an extension of the personal practice of worship in Islam. This spectrum of faith in action can be found in a diverse set of contemporary models as well as an array of weaknesses that must be addressed before the Islamic nationalist movement can be successfully established.

Contemporary Models and Weaknesses

Contemporary models. A contemporary model for what not to do is the majority of the secular, or otherwise, nationalisms that focus on improving the material (e.g., economical )conditions of the people. However, money and wealth should not be the goal of economic development but rather it should be to meet the basic needs of the true majority of the people. Islamic nationalists should remember and remind the populations the traditional description of the early Muslims: they were so occupied with the Hereafter and living righteous lives that they did not chase this world so the world, and all its benefits, chased them.

            The Iranian revolution’s popular and social movement is noteworthy due to its lack of military tactics and implementation of mobilizing the masses (Zubaida, 2004). Munson (2003) also notes the success of the Iranian revolution. This was a social revolution that aimed to establish an Islamic society, that failed only because it was weighed down and restrained by the corruption of particular nationalism rather than the only and true Islamic nationalism, the brotherhood of Islam. Hamas Charter of August 18, 1988 sets out the essential theoretical perspective in practice for Islamic nationalism, though it was stated it has failed to be implemented across the board. Article 12 of the charter stated “nationalism…is part of Islamic dogma. Nothing is loftier in nationalism or more profound than this: If the enemy invades a Muslim land, waging, jihad and fighting the enemy becomes an individual duty on every Muslim…. ” (as quoted in Munson, 2003, p. 44). Malaysia’s concept of Islam as an official religion with an Islamic state is a good starting point (Lubeck). They have successfully implemented sharia courts for Muslims through the use of regional religious authorities (Lubeck).

            Weaknesses. Commentators on the idea of Islamic nationalism point to the oppressive and genocidal incidents (i.e., Turks murdering Armenians & Greeks) of Muslim leaders, such as the Turks (Zubaida, 2004) in order to persuade the public that Islamic nationalism or any related concept is detrimental to the human condition. However, what is misunderstood in this case is that these acts were committed in the name of the secular Turkish nationalism, not Islamic nationalism. Zubaida (2004) characterized victims of the Turkish nationalism correctly when he stated that the “non-Muslims at the beginning of the twentieth century [in the Turkish republic] were also non-Turks” (p. 413). Keddie (1969) points out three similarities between Islamic nationalism and it secular counterpart: aggressive cultural defensiveness, local nationalist pride, and historicism. Within the practical theory of Islamic nationalism these are all weaknesses of secular thought that a well-disciplined, Muslim leadership should share with the Muslim masses.

            In addition, Muslims in the West have followed the lead of previous minority organizations in seeking accommodation from the dominant system, which noted is a position of inferiority and weakness. These attempts have lead to communal divisions (Zubaida, 2003) which have only further weakened the organizational capacities of the Muslim communities. As Zubaida rightly points out, this is a result of the mentality of Muslims seeing Islam as part of a bigger system of a multicultural society. Unlike the Sufi brotherhoods in Africa that accommodated African cultural elements that are contrary to Islam (Campbell, 1999), Islamic nationalism cannot afford to make this theological and practical mistake. Instead it will need to educate the masses on the diversity within Islam and furthermore will have to instill the core Islamic principle in all; however, this is only one of many steps that Islamic nationalists will have take to achieve success.

Steps

            With an improved perspective on the current conditions and faulty perceptions of Islamic nationalism, the activist and worker can proceed forward with an idea of the step that must be taken in order to ensure the successful establishment of Islamic nationalism. In line with Gellner’s (1983) theoretical perspective of emphasizing on education as a key component to nationalism, Mabry (1998) states that education is “responsible for the ongoing production of coherent citizens in a modern state” (p. 66). There must be standardization across the globe, and at the very least the national level that is implemented locally, to create a truly connected and self-aware imagined community (Anderson, 2006). Mabry (1998) further elaborates that “High Islam [scripturalist and literalist] is the key to the success of the faith in maintaining its strength even when surrounded by the corrosive effects of modern secular orders” (p. 71). It is vital to understand that if a non-Muslim scholar appreciates and recognizes fundamentalism as the necessary element in achieving a collective success, it is even more important for the Muslims to implement such a strategy, which is commanded. The discourse of the Islamic knowledge should be guided with widespread, uniform Islamic education. This is vital in strengthening the bond of brotherhoods through the informal networks that exist in all societies. However, by guiding the masses to read, learn, internalize and act upon Islamic knowledge will lead to an empowered society that parallels the first Muslim generations.

            Many Islamic activists speak on and strive for the unity of Muslims and make this the most immediate goal. However, this unity must be refined to an active unity; in other words a unity that is not secular, private, individualistic, or other than Islamic in nature. The Islamic nation cannot allow simple political divides turn into long-term racial, only since post-colonial times, divides such as the Sunni-Shia.

            Though Islam celebrates diversity, its core is found in the Arabic language. This is not a exaltation or status-giving privilege to the Arab culture (see The Prophet Muhammad’s Last Sermon) but rather a uniformity of knowledge that leads to unity. Campbell states “the primacy of Arabic in scripture, law and devotion which alone provides the convert with the means to understand and participate in Islam” (p. 115). This understanding and participation is in Arabic but the day-to-day social life is in the native language of the population. Fulfilling this obligation of learning Arabic, fulfills an individual need and the effort will lead to create cohesion, through shared language, across varying cultures and ethnicities. This is not to say that Islamic teaching cannot be in the native tongue of the people, to aid in comprehension (see Quran 14:4). However, each individual must be empowered with the mastery of the Arabic language so that he may read and understand the Quran and prophetic traditions himself. It is necessary to link information, of which understanding is core, with the primary source of knowledge.

            Contrary to Mabry’s (1998) perspective that the egalitarianism found in Islam lacks in dealing with women justly, the Quran and hadith elaborate a much different position. However, it is Muslim’s struggle to accommodate foreign (i.e., Western/secular) values have forsaken this revealed social order at the expense of the women. It is critical to point out that the concept of egalitarianism in Islam is based upon equal amounts of justice, consideration, and respect rather than a simple repetition of treatment for all. This Islamic formulation falls right in line with the way the Western/secular societies would deal with a handicapped person, different but with equal amount of respect. Furthermore, much like the formal and informal rules concerning the handicapped in the West, the rules concerning women in Islam is there for their (i.e., the women’s) best interest (e.g., protection & support).

            Mabry (1998) give excellence to positivist reason above that of faith in developing technology. However, this subtle distinction is assuming that the former is not part of or dependent upon the latter. The examples of the early Muslim generations are an example of this dynamic. It can be confidently stated that if it were not for the preservation, refinement, elaboration, and addition to the Greek and Roman contributions, certain modern technologies would not have been possible. The intellectual and technological contributions of the Muslims’ striving for perfect faith in acknowledging God’s presence in the world around them is evident in the Islamic roots in areas such as medicine, biology, mathematics, physics and many others.

            Mabry (1998) is wrong when referring to a prohibition on independent thought in Islam. Islam provides the contrary and is evidenced in the overwhelming amount of commentaries on ancient, non-Muslim thinkers by early Muslims. As a matter of fact, there is a prophetic tradition that commands Muslims to seek knowledge even if it were to take them to China, a non-Muslim and very distant land in the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. However, Mabry is correct in his observation that this is lacking in the current Muslims. In order to move forward and out of oppression and the darkness of ignorance the Muslims must seek and adhere to the illuminating principles of Islam to guide their developments. These developments should and will address the material, social, and spiritual needs of all mankind

            Islam came not only as a set of rituals to worship the divine, but rather as a comprehensive way of life that addresses all ills of individuals and society at large. Social justice was a concept and goal found in Islam since the very beginning and as such must always be strived for.  Though often overlooked by secular nations at their own demise (e.g., Tanzania; Campbell, 1999), Islamic nationalism must strive to establish such a condition. The opportunity for such a strategy has already presented itself and been taken by some; however, now is the time for a collective move towards achieving this goal. Campbell stated “With the collapse of nationalism new forms of protest and collective action appear to be emerging in which protestors draw upon a broad range of ideas and ideologies concerned with social justice including Islam which increasingly informs local cultural understandings” (p. 118). This local understanding of Islamic social justice must now be taken global. Keeping in line with addressing the mistakes and weaknesses of the current and previous Muslim leaders, Islamic nationalism must develop, establish, and protect accountable institutions.  Lubeck (n.d.) rightfully points out that the Muslim world is crippled at the hands of the corrupt states in power. Campbell stated it best, “no government whatever its composition, is likely to secure sufficient national support for its policies unless and until steps are taken to ensure that politicians and political institutions are publicly accountable…” (p. 122). Interestingly enough there is an example of accountability of the Islamic head of state in the second successor of the Prophet Muhammad, Omar ibn al-Khattab.

            It is found in the biography of the Prophet Muhammad that he would refuse the assistance or participation of non-Muslims in the armed struggle against the enemies of the Muslims. At the time being a small number, this would have seemed unwise or counterproductive to establishing Islam. However, the truth is that the cause of Islam cannot be achieved by those that do not internalize and champion publicly the system of Islam. Activists such as Afghani corrupted their causes by struggling alongside non-Muslims in his fight against the British (Keddie, 1969). It is logical to understand that if the foundation of a movement is impure then its structure and results will be lack in substance, effectiveness, and overall ability to fulfill its goals. In addition, the impure element of patronage systems that often riddle Muslim nations (Lubeck) must be eliminated. These systems are remnants of ignorance. The systems are symptoms of the ethnic/tribal pride that should be existence, especially above an Islamic identity.

            Finally, the distinction between the temporal and religious leadership is not native to Islam and should be abolished. The central leader of the caliphate (i.e., the religious temporal leader of the Muslims) should be re-established alongside the advisory body of the ulama (i.e., religious scholars and theologians; Warner & Wenner, 2006).

Conclusion

            In conclusion, “nationalism here is belief, homeland here is Dar-ul-Islam, the ruler here is God, and the constitution here is the Quran” (Qutb, n.d.). Purcell comments on the “cosmopolitan sensibility of Islamic practices” (p. 99) but wrongly points to the changing of Islam. Unfortunately, Muslims have also adopted this mentality and not realized that the basis of Islamic knowledge (i.e., Quran and hadith), and by default Islam, has not changed but the Muslim populations have. In addition, “It may therefore be said in conclusion of this modern doctrine of nationalism, that although it introduces into Islam features which may not accord with strict orthodoxy, it is the least incompatible perhaps of modern European doctrines with the political thought and political experience of Sunni Islam” (Haim, 1955, p. 149)

Gellner stated that fundamentalism is the belief “that a given faith is to be upheld firmly in its full and literal form, free of compromise, softening, reinterpretation or diminution” (as quoted in Mabry, 1998, p. 70). This fundamentalism is absolutely true, a prerequisite for Islam, and supported with the Quran (see Quran 2:208 & 4:65). Following in suite of the Jews of times past (see Maccabees 3:59), there now follows a strong religious nationalism that adheres to the revelation in whole: Islamic nationalism. The Islamic nationalist must not allow his personal or preferred local/specific culture define the Islamic national identity (Campbell, 1999). The only viable model is the early Muslims under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, in other words the Madinan society.

As s preventative measure, it must be stated that contrary to popular belief and practice “religious nationalism fills existent state forms with new cultural contents, new sources of authority; it does not displace them” (Friedland, 2001, p. 139).  In all actuality, they follow the same path as secular nationalisms of the application of theoretical works into practice (Friedland). Lubeck (n.d.) stated that “the potential of the Islamist alternative depends on its capacity to transform the cultural solidarity, social discipline, and informally organized services into an alliance capable of delivering existing services and coping with the development demands of the new global economy” (p. 306).  At present time the most viable option for the Islamic nationalism to be established is in an alliance between the numerous Muslims organizations in the American context. This alliance must be a reformulation of perspective that envisions all groups and organizations as indifferent and as complimentary parts of one organization, the ummah. Included in this reformatting would be a structure of authority and responsibilities that is respected and supported.

The optimism that the American context is ripe for the development of Islamic nationalism is best justified with the contextual description Foran (as cited in Friedland ,2001) offers: “a social revolution can occur where there is a multi-class or populist oppositional culture, conditions of economic decline, or a world-system opening—generally an American failure to intervene decisively in the internal politics of the country” (Friedland, p. 131). This is perhaps the reason why Islam is the fastest growing religion in the Western and why if Islamic nationalism is properly taken to the American masses a true change in paradigm can take place in collective action: a call to Islam through the vehicle of Islamic nationalism. Warner and Wenner (2006) stated that “it may be counterintuitive, but Islam in Europe, a religion which is not protected by state law and subsidies, may be the one which more vibrant and responsive to its followers and potential followers” (p. 472). Though some theorists dismiss the collective action capabilities of Islam (Warner & Wenner, 2006), especially in the Western context, the truth is that history tells a different story (e.g., the Arabian, African, Asian and European spread of Islam during the caliphate). The critical difference is that the Muslims at that point in time were spreading Islam, not a specific culture infused with Islam. In addition, the spread and work of the Muslims at that time was to establish Islam as the parallel system of social life rather than a subpart alternative to the secular, individualistic oppression that exists in the Western context today. The goal today is to revive the reforming nature of Islam so that the societies are changed from the inside out, with the incompatible institutions being changed out willingly by the masses. 

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